

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 ACCRA 04300 01 OF 02 301446Z
ACTION AF-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 EUR-12 IO-13 ARA-10 SS-15 SP-02
PM-05 NSCE-00 H-01 L-03 CIAE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00
DODE-00 SSO-00 INRE-00 /082 W
-----013223 301514Z /64
O 301351Z MAY 78
FM AMEMBASSY ACCRA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3819

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 ACCRA 4300

EO 11652: XGDS-3
TAGS: XA, CU, UR, MPOL, GH
SUBJ: SOVIET AND CUBAN ROLE IN AFRICA

REF: (A) STATE 764913 (B) ACCRA 4004 (C) 77 HAVANA 0480
(D) ACCRA 3666

1. SUMMARY: GHANAIAAN OFFICIALS ARE CONCERNED BY COMMUNISM AND TO A CERTAIN EXTENT BY SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN AFRICA, BUT ARE MUCH MORE RELAXED ABOUT CUBAN INTERVENTION. THEY HAVE NOT ADDRESSED PROBLEMS ATTENDANT ON SOVIET/CUBAN ROLE AND HAVE NO CLEAR PRESCRIPTIONS FOR DEALING WITH THEM. SOVIET/CUBAN ROLE IS NOT SEEN AS A MAJOR ISSUE DIVIDING AFRICAN COUNTRIES BUT WOULD QUICKLY BE CONSIDERED AS SUCH IF SOVIETS OR CUBANS WERE PROVED TO BE DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN INVASION OF ZAIRE OR IN OTHER VIOLATIONS OF TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF AFRICAN STATES. IN BROADER TERMS, MOST GHANAIAAN OFFICIALS DO NOT BELIEVE OUR ASSERTIONS THAT CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IS DANGEROUS FOR AFRICA. END SUMMARY.

2. GHANA'S HEAD OF STATE, GEN. I.K. ACHEAMPONG, HAS OFTEN TOLD AMBASSADOR PRIVATELY THAT HE IS ALARMED BY COMMUNISM AND BY SOVIET MACHINATIONS, WHICH HE FEELS ARE OFTEN DESIGNED TO TOPPLE ESTABLISHED

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 ACCRA 04300 01 OF 02 301446Z

GOVERNMENTS. MOST RECENTLY, IN COMMENTS MEANT TO BE RELAYED TO US, ACHEAMPONG TOLD FRG AMBASSADOR HERE ON MAY 11 (REF B) THAT HE IS A DEDICATED OPPONENT OF COMMUNISM AND WOULD IMMEDIATELY DISMISS ANYONE IN HIS GOVERNMENT HE SUSPECTED OF COMMUNIST TIES. ON THE OTHER HAND, ACHEAMPONG SEEMS TO FEEL SOVIET LONG-TERM PROSPECTS ON THE CONTINENT ARE NIL; IN THE

SAME CONVERSATION, HE SAID THERE IS NO CHANCE FOR THE COMMUNISTS TO OBTAIN A REAL Foothold IN AFRICA, "NOT EVEN IN ANGOLA OR ETHIOPIA."

3. TO OUR KNOWLEDGE, ACHEAMPONG HAS NEVER SPECIFICALLY CONDEMNED CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IN AFRICA. CONSUMED AS HE IS BY PRESSING INTERNAL PROBLEMS AND CONSIDERING THE SOVIETS, NOT THE CUBANS, TO BE THE REAL THREAT, HE DOES NOT SEEM TO HAVE PAID MUCH ATTENTION TO THE CUBAN ROLE PER SE. HIS MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (MFA) OFFICIALS, HOWEVER, ARE MORE ARTICULATE ON THE SUBJECT. WHILE THERE ARE DIFFERING VIEWS WITHIN MFA (AND, INDEED, WITHIN THE EDUCATED COMMUNITY AS WELL), ON BALANCE MOST GHANAIAAN OFFICIALS SEEM QUITE RELAXED ABOUT CUBAN INTERVENTION. THEY GENERALLY ARGUE THAT LIBERATION MOVEMENTS, REJECTED BY THE WEST, HAVE HAD TO ACCEPT HELP FROM OTHER QUARTERS; THAT INDEPENDENCE AND NATIONALISM, NOT COMMUNISM, MOTIVATE MOST AFRICANS; AND THAT CUBANS WILL LEAVE AFRICA VOLUNTARILY ONCE THERE IS NO FURTHER NEED FOR THEIR SERVICES. ON THE OTHER HAND, SOME INFLUENTIAL FORMER MILITARY AND LEGAL OFFICIALS (NOW IN PRIVATE LIFE) HAVE EXPRESSED TO US THEIR ACUTE CONCERN ABOUT CUBAN INTERVENTION IN AFRICA.

4. OVER THE LAST SIX MONTHS, GHANA'S RELATIONS WITH
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 ACCRA 04300 01 OF 02 301446Z

CUBA--VIRTUALLY DORMANT SINCE THE OVERTHROW OF NKRUMAH IN 1966--HAVE SHOWN NEW SIGNS OF LIFE. COMMISSIONER (MINISTER) FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, COL. R.J.A. FELLI MADE A FIVE-DAY TRIP TO CUBA IN OCTOBER 1977. CUBAN PRESS PLAYED UP GHANA'S ALLEGED SUPPORT FOR CUBA'S ROLE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA (REF C). JOINT COMMUNIQUE ISSUED AT END OF VISIT WAS MORE MUTED BUT NEVERTHELESS SHOWED GHANA'S SYMPATHY WITH CUBAN AIMS. (IN COMMUNIQUE, GHANAIAAN SIDE "EXPRESSED ITS SATISFACTION WITH THE CONTRIBUTION THE CUBAN PEOPLE HAD MADE TO THE STRUGGLE OF THE AFRICAN PEOPLES AGAINST COLONIALISM AND RACISM.) MORE RECENTLY, AS A FOLLOW-UP TO FELLI'S TRIP, A THREE-PERSON CUBAN ECONOMIC TEAM VISITED GHANA IN APRIL 1978 (REF D) TO EXPLORE TECHNICAL COOPERATION AND TRADE IN SUGAR AND TIMBER. TAKING THESE PORTENTS ALL TOGETHER, WE JUDGE THAT WHILE GHANA DOES NOT ACTIVELY WELCOME CUBAN MILITARY INTERVENTION IN AFRICA, IT IS RECEPTIVE TO CLOSER TIES WITH CUBA AND PROBABLY SUPPORTS CUBAN INTERVENTION AS A REGRETTABLE BUT NECESSARY STEP IN THE LIBERATION OF SOUTHERN AFRICAN AND PROTECTION OF AFRICAN

TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY.

5. WE OURSELVES ARE NOT SURE WHAT PROBLEMS USUALLY ATTEND SOVIET/CUBAN ROLE IN AFRICA BUT SURMISE THIS REFERS TO SUCH MATTERS AS FRICTION BETWEEN CUBANS AND LOCAL POPULACE, AS IN ANGOLA. IN ANY CASE, GOG HAS NOT ADDRESSED THESE PROBLEMS AND HAS NO CLEAR PRESCRIPTIONS TO DEAL WITH THEM. OUR GUESS

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 ACCRA 04300 02 OF 02 301453Z
ACTION AF-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 EUR-12 IO-13 ARA-10 SS-15 SP-02
PM-05 NSCE-00 H-01 L-03 CIAE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00
DODE-00 SSO-00 INRE-00 /082 W
-----013281 301514Z /64

O 301351Z MAY 78
FM AMEMBASSY ACCRA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3820

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 ACCRA 4300

IS THAT GOG WOULD LIKE TO SEE THEM HANDLED ON AN AD HOC CASE-BY-CASE BASIS BY GOVERNMENTS MOST DIRECTLY INVOLVED.

6. SOVIET/CUBAN ROLE IS NOT SEEN HERE, IN OUR VIEW, AS A MAJOR ISSUE DIVIDING AFRICAN COUNTRIES. IF IT WERE PROVED, HOWEVER, THAT SOVIETS OR CUBANS WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN SHABA INVASION OR IN OTHER VIOLATIONS OF AFRICAN TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, GHANA WOULD BE ALARMED BY SUCH INVOLVEMENT AND WOULD QUICKLY CONDEMN IT, PRIVATELY BUT STRONGLY. IT IS HARD TO SAY WHAT "PROOF" WOULD BE REQUIRED BUT IN THE CASE OF SHABA, WE WOULD PROBABLY HAVE HAD TO PRODUCE SOME SOVIET OR CUBAN PRISONERS WHO HAD BEEN DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN INVASION AS COMBATANTS OR FRONT-LINE MILITARY ADVISERS. WITHOUT SUCH EVIDENCE, GHANA IS UNLIKELY TO JEOPARDIZE ITS RELATIONS WITH USSR AND CUBA BY ATTACKING THEIR AFRICAN POLICIES.

7. IN BROADER TERMS, MOST GHANAIAAN OFFICIALS DO NOT ACCEPT OUR ASSERTIONS THAT CUBAN INVOLVEMENT ON THE SIDE OF LIBERATION MOVEMENTS OR TO DEFEND

FRONTIERS IS INTRINSICALLY BAD FOR AFRICA OR HARMFUL
TO AMERICA'S REAL INTERESTS IN AFRICA. WE BELIEVE
THAT UNTIL A MORE CONVINCING CASE IS MADE, MOST
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 ACCRA 04300 02 OF 02 301453Z

GHANAIAAN OFFICIALS WILL DISMISS OUR WARNINGS AS
COLD-WAR HOLDOVERS OR LAST-DITCH ATTEMPTS TO PROTECT

SHORT-TERM AMERICAN INFLUENCE AND INVESTMENTS IN
AFRICA. IF THIS ANALYSIS IS CORRECT, IT SUGGESTS
THAT WE NEED TO ARTICULATE OUR POLICIES, AND THE
REASONS BEHIND THEM, WITH GREATER CLARITY AND
FORCEFULNESS. SMITH

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: INTERVENTION, COMBAT OPERATIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 30 may 1978
Decaption Date: 01 jan 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978ACCRA04300
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: X3
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780225-1313
Format: TEL
From: ACCRA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780510/aaaaahrt.tel
Line Count: 187
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: af1e4693-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION AF
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: 78 STATE 764913, 78 ACCRA 4004, 77 HAVANA 480, 78 ACCRA 3666
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 04 may 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2506621
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: SOVIET AND CUBAN ROLE IN AFRICA
TAGS: MPOL, XA, CU, UR, GH
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/af1e4693-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014